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ABSTRACT
JavaScript Metamorphic Malware Detection Using Machine Learning Techniques
by Aakash Wadhwani
Various factors like defects in the operating system, email attachments from
unknown sources, downloading and installing a software from non-trusted sites make
computers vulnerable to malware attacks. Current antivirus techniques lack the
ability to detect metamorphic viruses, which vary the internal structure of the original
malware code across various versions, but still have the exact same behavior throughout.
Antivirus software typically relies on signature detection for identifying a virus, but
code morphing evades signature detection quite effectively.
JavaScript is used to generate metamorphic malware by changing the code’s
Abstract Syntax Tree without changing the actual functionality, making it very
difficult to detect by antivirus software. As JavaScript is prevalent almost everywhere,
it becomes an ideal candidate language for spreading malware.
This research aims to detect metamorphic malware using various machine learning
models like K Nearest Neighbors, Random Forest, Support Vector Machine, and Naïve
Bayes. It also aims to test the effectiveness of various morphing techniques that
can be used to reduce the accuracy of the classification model. Thus, this involves
improvement on both fronts of generation and detection of the malware helping
antivirus software detect morphed codes with better accuracy. In this research,
JavaScript based metamorphic engine reduces the accuracy of a trained malware
detector. While N-gram frequency based feature vectors give good accuracy results
for classifying metamorphic malware, HMM feature vectors provide the best results.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is computer software that is developed with the intention of infiltrating
a computer system without the user’s consent. The main purpose of a malware is
to extract critical information from one’s system and access confidential resources
without a user’s permission. This malware can delete files from a user’s computer
and infect them with malicious code, thereby stealing private information from a user
or causing a computer to cease to work normally. These codes stop the execution of
non-malicious code or run beside them to harm the host computer.
There are millions of services and web applications on the web, such as social
networking websites, content distribution websites, entertainment, and academic sites
making the internet a core part of our daily lives. With its ubiquity and popularity,
the web has become an integral platform for malware creators. Malware seeks to evade
security mechanisms by performing activities like getting access to the user’s computer
and its resources, delaying services provided by users through denial of service(DoS)
attacks, and unwanted spamming. It becomes very difficult for the end user to protect
their system from malware, since most of them lack the expertise. There is no central
authority to ensure security as the web is a vast distributed system.
While there are few ways to introduce malware using HTML, Javascript enables
the malware writers to download and run malicious code by making the victim
browse any website. Bugs in Javascript or incorrect implementations could introduce
backdoors which can be exploited by attackers. The ubiquitous nature of JavaScript
across the web makes the users vulnerable to many attacks. Even a small amount
of Javascript code inside a HTML file is enough to record any activity on a website
without having to submit anything. The activities like scrolling, cursor movements,
keystrokes can be recorded for the purposes of understanding user’s behavior without
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their consent. One of the possibilities of JavaScript is cross-site scripting(XSS). Cross
side scripting enables hackers to embed malicious Javascript based code inside a
legitimate web page. This will make the end user get affected by malwares even by
visiting the trusted websites. Server-side malware involves malware scripts that casuse
Denial of Service attacks, backdoors, web-shells, and bruteforce attacks [4].
Over the years, several techniques have been introduced for the detection of
this malware. Signature detection is used by various antivirus software which detect
the malware based on the physical structure of the virus code. The major problem
with this detection technique is that when the virus code is morphed, providing
a newer version of the same code, it fails to detect the malware. This limitation
motivates the introduction of malware detection using machine learning techniques
like K Nearest Neighbors, Support Vector Machine, Random Forest, Naïve Bayes and
Hidden Markov Models (HMM). HMM is a statistical model which uses probability
distribution amongst the observation sequences containing malware and benign codes
to detect malwares.
In this research, we build a malware classifier and analyze various Javascript
code morphing techniques to deteriorate the accuracy of the classifier. Later, we
experiment on different machine learning techniques to better detect these morphed
malware files.
The chapters are organized in the following manner: Chapter 2 gives background
on malware and explains why it is important to detect them; Chapter 3 explains
the related work on malware detection; Chapter 4 explains the metamorphic engine
used to reduce the classification accuracy of a malware detector. Chapter 5 explains
the usage of Rhino JavsScript Engine to extract opcode sequences from source code.
Chapter 6 explains approaches to detect metamorphic malware files; and chapter 7
explain the experiments carried out to detect metamorphic malware.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1 Malware
Malware is software written to cause damage to any system on or off the
computer network. Much of the earlier malware were written with the inten-
tion of pranks or, in some cases Digital Rights Management (DRM). Sony Mu-
sic Compact discs installed a rootkit on buyers systems for preventing piracy,
but this gave access to unauthorized access to user’s listening habits lead-
ing to security vulnerabilities [5]. A security report by AV-Test [2] found
the drastic increase in development of new malware programs from 2007-2017.
Figure 1: New Malware programs in last 10 years [2]
The x-axis denotes the years from 2007-2018 and the y-axis denotes the number of
new malware programs. We can see the spike in 2014 where the number increased
from 83.2 million to 143.1 million. Thus, there is an aggressive need to solve malware
detection problem with such a huge rate in increase of new malware programs.
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2.2 Malware Types
Malware is a superset of all kinds of viruses families, Trojans, backdoor virus,
adware, worms, etc [6].
2.2.1 Virus
A virus is a type of malware which has the property of self-replication to spread
itself to other executable programs [7]. In turn, these affected executable programs
spread the infection to other benign files. The virus can live anywhere in the system
like in the executable files, data files, hidden files or even the boot sector. As explained
in [8] [7] [9], virus can exist before any antivirus program boots up or any other
operating system based security is enabled. Thus, the antivirus would be in no state
to prevent virus from infecting the system as even before the antivirus boots up, the
virus would have infected the system. The virus can also prevent the antivirus from
booting all together. This virus can then be spread across various means like email,
external storage devices like hard disk drives, pen drives, floppy drives, etc.
2.2.1.1 Encrypted virus
The initial approach to detect any virus was to store the signature of the virus,
in which an instruction sequence or a pattern is stored against each virus so that
next time same virus attempts to defect the system it can be detected [7] [9]. To go
around this trivial detection mechanism, malware writers introduced encrypted viruses
where a malware is encrypted with an encryption technique and key. Thus, signature
detection becomes difficult. The problem with this is that the code to decrypt is
also attached along with the encrypted malware’s body. But, it is still possible to
search and store encrypted pattern similar to storing a malware signature. And thus,
it can be still detected using signature detection. The decryptor loop is constant in
the encrypted virus and hence can be detected easily. Next logical approach [8] is to
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change the decryptor loop with each version of the virus.
2.2.1.2 Polymorphic Virus
The decryptor loop being constant in encrypted virus, makes it easier for detection.
There was a need to hide the decryption code and hence the inception of Polymorphic
malware [10]. With every version of the virus, the decrypted code is encrypted
too [7] [9]. Thus, with infinite possibilities of decryptor loop variations, it makes it
very difficult to detect Polymorphic virus by listing all possible combinations of the
decryptor loop [8]. Morphing of the decryptor loop is done in such a way that the the
code looks completely different but is logically the same [11].
2.2.1.3 Metamorphic Virus
In metamorphic virus, the entire body of the virus is morphed before affecting the
system [11] [7] [9]. Thus, it becomes very difficult to detect any metamorphic virus.
The appearance of the virus completely changes and hence it is very challenging to
detect these types of virus files [12] [13].
2.2.2 Worms
A worm is similar to a virus by having a property of self-replication to other
computers in the network [14]. The primary difference between a worm and a virus is
that the worm does not need a host file to rely on and can be an independent file that
damages other files [9] [7]. Worms can replicate rapidly and damage any system by
saturating it.
2.2.3 Trojan
Unlike a virus, A Trojan does not self-replicate. It acts as a harmless program
in the system. When the user click on these programs, the Trojans install harmful
programs in the system causing damage [8]. Trojans could delete files, remove any
data from the hard disk drive, open backdoors which act as security vulnerabilities in
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the system[9] [7]. They act as legitimate functions but instead drop malicious payloads
into the system.
2.2.4 Backdoor
The backdoor is a program that will allow other malicious programs to carry
out damage to the system [8]. The other user programs compromise the end users
confidential resources [7] [9]. Backdoors allow malicious programs to have damaging
consequences on the host computer like deleting all the files, stealing confidential
information, it also lets open communication ports allowing other computer systems
have remote control over the host computer.
2.3 Detection Techniques
In this section, we will look at the various detection techniques based on static
analysis like some pattern matching inside malware and dynamic analysis like behaviour
of the malware. Most antivirus software depend on signature based detection of
malware [15]. The dynamic analysis can be done by models like Hidden Markov
Models(HMM).
2.3.1 Signature Detection
Signature based detection is the most common technique in antivirus software
programs [16]. Signature detection is based on pattern matching, where a sequence of
bits against a malware program is stored on a malware database. When the antivirus
scans the system it searches for programs having the signatures in the malware
database. If any file gets matched with the files in the malware database it is marked
as a malware too and hence used later for malware signature matching.
The advantages of using signature based detection is speed and accuracy. With
this, the disadvantages of using signature based detection are that it only compares
the malware from the malware database. Any new malware files would never be
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detected by such static detection mechanisms. Thus, the malware database needs to
be constantly updated. Even a small obfuscation will cause this detection technique
to break. Thus, dynamic analysis is required for dynamic behaviors of the virus.
2.3.2 Behavioral Detection
Behavior based detection works on dynamic behavior of the files instead of the
static signature based analysis [17] [18]. The dynamic behavior of the file is extracted
by running a file in an emulated environment [7] [19]. The main purpose of this is
that even if the virus would look like a legitimate program, its functionality would
explain that it is actually a malware program. Behavior analysis along with machine
learning is used [20] to classify a file into a malware or a benign file. The emulator
would generate a report on each file, explaining the API features involved in the file.
These features are then used in the training phase and the files are classified into
malware or benign.
2.3.3 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection works on the approach of detecting if the file given follows
a normal behavior [7]. It overcomes the limitations of signature based detection by
using heuristic based approaches to detect normal behavior. Any file that doesn’t
classify as normal is then classified as a malware. The definition of anomalous and
normal is user defined, so it doesn’t provide a lot of accuracy in classification.
In [21], a malware detector was developed to classify the input files into classes
based on structure of the files. A test file which needs classification is given as an
input to the detector. The file is classified as anomalous if it looks like one, else it is
marked as benign. After classification, it is reviewed to determine if it was a malware
file or it was just a false positive case [16]. Anomaly detection might have a lot of
false positives or false negatives [16]. This is the reason Anomaly detection is used
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with Signature detection to provide higher accuracy.
2.3.4 Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
HMM is a statistical model which depends on the probability distribution of
the data and are well suited for statistical pattern analysis [1] [22] [23]. HMM is
a state machine which means that it can be in one of the set number of states
depending on the previous state and the present value of its input. In HMM, the
states are not visible to the user (hidden), hence is a special type of Markov model
and consequently named as Hidden Markov Models. In HMM, every state has a
probability distribution to observe a set of observation symbols and the transition
from one state to another has fixed probabilities. We can match the trained HMM
sequence against the test sequence/observation sequence. If the probability is high,
we can say that the observation sequence is similar to trained HMM sequence [1].
The following notations in Table 1 are used in HMM [1]:
Table 1: HMM Notations [1]
Symbol Definition
T length of the observation sequence
N number of states in the model
M number of distinct observation symbols
Q distinct states of the Markov Model
V set of possible observations
A state transition probability matrix
B observation probability matrix
𝜋 initial state distribution
O observation sequence
A HMM is defined by the matrices A, B and 𝜋.
An HMM is denoted as 𝜆 = (A, B, 𝜋).
The Generic view of Hidden Markov Model [1] is explained in Figure 2 Hidden
Markov Model solve three types of problems.
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Figure 2: Generic view of Hidden Markov Model [1]
Problem 1: Given a model 𝜆 = (A, B, 𝜋) and an observation sequence O, we need
to find P(O|𝜆). So, we need to find an observation sequence that fits well to a given
model.
Problem 2: Given a model 𝜆 = (A, B, 𝜋) and an observation sequence O, most
likely hidden state sequence can be determined for the model.
Problem 3: Given O, N, M, we can find a model 𝜆 that maximizes probability of
O. That is we train the model in order to best fit an observation sequence [1].
In this project, Problem 3 is used. Problem 3 is used when we train the model
using the malware source code observation sequence and later files are scored against
this model using machine learning classification. If the observation sequence is close
to the trained model, we say it is also a malware, otherwise it is not.
Problem 1, Problem 2 and Problem 3 are solved by Forward Algorithm, Backward
Algorithm, Baum-Welch re-estimation algorithm.
The forward algorithm determines P(O|𝜆) [1] which is the probability of being in
a state 𝑞𝑖 given an observation sequence O [1].
Baum-Welch algorithm is described in [1] [7] and explained as follows:
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1. Initialize 𝜆 = (A, B, 𝜋) with random values for A, B and 𝜋 and making the
matrices row stochastic.
2. Compute 𝛼𝑡(𝑖), 𝛽𝑡(𝑖), 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) and 𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) Equation for digammas:
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝛼𝑡(𝑖)𝑎𝑖,𝑗𝑏𝑗(𝑂𝑡+1)𝛽𝑡+1(𝑗)
𝑃 (𝑂|𝜆) (1)
3. 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) and 𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) relation:
𝛾𝑡(𝑖) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) (2)
4. Re-estimate: For i = 0, 1, . . . , N - 1 let
𝜋𝑖 = 𝛾0(𝑖) (3)
5. For i = 0, 1, . . . , N - 1 and j = 0, 1, . . . , N - 1, compute
𝑎𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)/
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑖) (4)
6. For j = 0, 1, . . . , N - 1 and k = 0, 1, . . . , M - 1, compute
𝑏𝑗(𝑘) =
∑︁
𝑡∈(0,1,....𝑇−2),𝑂𝑡=𝑘
𝛾𝑡(𝑗)/
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑗) (5)
7. for increase in P(O|𝜆) go to step 3.
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CHAPTER 3
Related Work
Machine Learning has been long involved in malware detection. Naïve Bayes is
a model that works on the likelihood of certain features in the model. This model
is introduced by Schultz et al [24] for malware detection. If certain features occur
in a malware, the probability of these featues occurring in any test file is taken and
predicted if the given file is a malware. The cons of this approach is that if the features
are changed, the model will fail to detect malware files. Heuristic based machine
learning is introduced by Bazrafshan et al [15] for malware detection. To overcome
the limitation of Naïve Bayes, Hidden Markov Model (HMM) for malware detection
is introduced by Rezaei et al [25].
Sridhara [26] explains opcode extraction from a source code as features for the
purpose of training an HMM on those opcodes. Hidden Markov Model performs much
better as compared to signature-based detection when it comes to unseen malware.
As compared to behavior based detection [18], HMM is much faster as it doesn’t take
time to run the malware to verify its intent. According to Rezaei et al. [25], HMM
provides more than 70% of malware detection which is 15% more than any other
antivirus techniques.
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CHAPTER 4
Morphing Engine
The idea of the morphing engine is to morph the Javascript code into another
form of code, which would have different physical appearance, but would be logically
the same. In this research, we will look at morphing code at the Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST) level [27].
4.1 Abstract Syntax Tree
Abstract Syntax Tree is a representation of source code in a hierarchical format
according to the programming language grammar [28]. Irrespective of the programming
language used, the source code needs to parsed as plain text and converted into an
Abstract Syntax Tree data structure (AST). The software that parses the plain text
and converts it into a logical grammar can be a compiler(C, JAVA, RUST) or an
interpreter(JavaScript, Python, Ruby). The role of the Abstract Syntax Tree along
with presenting the code in a structured format, is to also help in semantic analysis
of the code, resulting in validating the correctness of the language used. ASTs are
also used to generate bytecode or machine code going forward. Applications of AST
include language transpilation. For example, we could represent a Python based code
into its AST and that will be used to generate JavaScript based code or reverse.
In compiler design [29], after tokenization, the parsing phase will take those tokens
and generate an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST). It converts the plain text code into
a logical structure as understood by the language, and it will skip spaces, new lines,
and comments to create that logical structure and hence prefixed as "Abstract". The
parser will attempt to match tokens to pre-defined pattern of tokens. For example,
assignment = identifier, equals, identifier ;
Given a simple code like in the Listing 4.1, we get the Abstract syntax Tree as given
in Figure 3
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Listing 4.1: Sample Code
func t i on function_1 ( ){
var a = 2 ;
var b = a ;
}
Figure 3: Abstract Syntax Tree using esprima
This is an example of Abstract Syntax Tree of a very simple JavaScript code.
This tree is later converted into assembly code. Our focus is on morphing using the
AST. Since we have the logical structure of the code, we can morph the variable names,
the way that program is written, have different permutations and combinations of
the functions/variables, etc.
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4.2 Engine Implementation Details
For morphing, certain steps are followed for each source code:
• Convert Code To AST:
The user inputs the JavaScript code which is converted to an abstract syntax
tree using the nodeJS module Esprima [30]. The abstract syntax tree is a tree
representation of the abstract syntactic structure of the source code. This is
useful because it abstracts the details of the programming language for us and
gives us essential information about instruction required to morph the code.
• Morphing:
The provided AST is then morphed with the techniques explained in 4.4. Esprima
provides the AST in a JSON format and morphing the JSON would refer to
changing the values at certain keys and rearranging certain key-value pairs.
• Convert AST to Code: The abstract syntax tree after morphing is converted
back to JavaScript code using the module escodegen [31]. Escodegen [31] has
the reverse functionality of esprima where it converts the AST back to its code.
Thus, the end result of this would be a morphed code. With every iteration we
can morph with different permutations of the techniques mentioned and provide
with a different version of the same code everytime.
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4.3 Architecture Overview
Figure 4: Morphing Engine Architecture
In the architecture, JavaScript code can be morphed to many levels. The original
code is morphed using the techniques explained in 4.4 and converted back to a
JavaScript code. Again, this code can be morphed further with the same set of
techniques providing different levels of morphing. This will eventually make the
code extremely hard for detection. Even though, with introducing such high level of
morphing, the code would logically be the same. Just that, with every new generation
it would have a different physical appearance.
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Listing 4.2: Original Code
func t i on morphEngine ( ){
var a = 2 ;
func t i on morphEngineInner ( ){
var a = 24 ;
}
}
4.4 Techniques Used
This is the heart of the architecture, where the code is actually obfuscated.
Morphing is done on the Abstract Syntax Tree provided by esprima. The following
techniques are performed on the recieved AST JSON.
4.4.1 Variable Renaming
Variable renaming refers to changing the name of the variable in the entire code
and maintaining a representation of a scope. In JavaScript we can have functions
inside a function having same named variables. We need to keep track of the scope
we are in to change any variable names. The data structure used is a stack. With
every scope, we add the variables on the top of the stack contained in the current
scope. We then change variables inside that scope using the variables on top of the
stack. While parsing the AST, we only change the Variable declarations in the code.
A new generated variable is assigned to respective variables for which a key-value pair
is maintained.
In the Listing 4.2, the variable "a" above is declared in different functional scopes
and hence will have different definitions of the variable. We need to account for both
these variables. Listing 4.3 is the code after morphing.
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Listing 4.3: Variable Renaming
func t i on morphEngine ( ){
var xyz = 2 ;
func t i on morphEngineInner ( ){
var pqr = 24 ;
}
}
Listing 4.4: Original Code
func t i on morphEngine ( ){
var xyz = 2 ;
}
4.4.2 Dead Code Insertion
In this technique we insert pieces of code in the original code that changes the
signature of the original code without changing its functionality. In our implementation
we count the number of instructions and use that number as a seed to generate a
random number, which decides the number of times the dead code will be inserted and
the position of the insertion of the code is also randomized. This will ensure that there
is no pattern that can be found using subsequent morphed codes. In our example,
I have inserted no-operation instructions like empty function, empty console.log,
empty setTimeout functions, etc. as explained in the Listing 4.4
Thus, in this we have inserted setTimeout, console.log. This does change the
signature as it looks different than the original code. But these code will not include
any logical changes as explained in Listing 4.5
4.4.3 Instruction Reordering
For this morphing technique we find out variable declaration instructions from
the abstract syntax tree. We make sure that the instructions are independent and
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Listing 4.5: Dead Code Insertion
func t i on morphEngine ( ){
setTimeout ( func t i on ( ) { } ) ;
var xyz = 2 ;
setTimeout ( func t i on ( ) { } ) ;
c on so l e . l og ( " " ) ;
}
Listing 4.6: Original Code
func t i on morphEngine ( ){
var a = 2 ;
var b = 5 ;
}
continuous to minimize the risk of introduction of bugs. Once such instructions are
identified we swap them. This will swap the order of the declaration of the variable
and help in changing the signature of the code as explained in Listing 4.6. After
instruction reordering, we get the code in Listing 4.7. This doesn’t change the logical
structure of the code, but only permutes various variable declarations.
4.4.4 Function Reordering
Similar to instruction reordering, functions can be reordered in various permuta-
tions and combinations. Suppose, with n different functions, we can arrange it in n!
different ways giving n! different morphed generations of the code [9] as explained in
Listing 4.8. Permutations are done on this code, since there are 2 functions, it can be
Listing 4.7: Instruction Reordering
func t i on morphEngine ( ){
var b = 5 ;
var a = 2 ;
}
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Listing 4.8: Original Code
func t i on function_1 ( ){
var b = 5 ;
var a = 2 ;
}
func t i on function_2 ( ){
conso l e . l og (" Cal led func t i on number 2 " ) ;
}
Listing 4.9: Function reordering
func t i on function_2 ( ){
conso l e . l og (" Cal led func t i on number 2 " ) ;
}
func t i on function_1 ( ){
var b = 5 ;
var a = 2 ;
}
arranged in 2! = 2 ways. Thus, the resulting code would look like in Listing 4.9
4.4.5 Instruction Substitution
Arithmetic instruction substitution is done in which the arithmetic operators
are substituted with other operators. Best example is when we add 2 numbers, for
example, if we have an expression var a = 2 + 2, it will be replaced with var a =
2 - -2 which would result in the same result. The Original code is given in Listing
4.10 and it will be replaced by code in Listing 4.11.
With these techniques, the end result will be a completely morphed code, with
completely different physical structure but will be logically the same. This morphing
can be applied many times over the same code or on morphed code to provide different
physical structures.
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Listing 4.10: Original Code
func t i on i n s t r u c t i o nSub s t i t u t i o n ( ){
var a = 5 + 5 ;
var b = 2 − 2 ;
var c = 2 ∗ 6 ;
var d = 4/2 ;
}
Listing 4.11: Instruction Substitution
func t i on i n s t r u c t i o nSub s t i t u t i o n ( ){
var a = 5 − −5;
var b = 2 + −2;
var c = 2 ∗ 12/2 ;
var d = 4 ∗ 1/2 ;
}
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CHAPTER 5
Rhino
Netscape created a project called as Rhino which is a Javscript Engine written
in Java. Rhino can be used to convert JavaScript code to Java classes and run in
one of the two modes - compiled or interpreted. Javascript code is converted to Java
bytecode and then run as a Java program to improve the execution time of Javascript.
5.1 Architecture
Rhino is based on a four step process:
• Parser
• Bytecode generator
• Interpreter
• JIT
The first phase is parsing where the code is converted into an Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST). In second phase, this AST is given to a Bytecode generator, which
generates a JAVA bytecode. The Rhino Interpreter then takes this bytecode as an
input and converts it into a machine code with the help of JIT. This machine code is
then executed.
Block diagram [3] of Rhino JavaScript can be used for reference.
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Figure 5: Rhino Block Diagram [3]
Parser: Parser has information of all the Javascript literals. It will tokenize the
Javascript code and use it to generate AST. In the generated syntax tree, each leaf
node represent the operands and each non-leaf node represents the operation like
subtraction, comparison, addition, equivalence, etc. Greatest Common Divisor(GCD)
example by binary algorithm [9] is given in Listing 5.1. The AST for the Listing 5.1
is given in Figure 6
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Listing 5.1: GCD example [9]
f unc t i on GCD ( num1 , num2 )
{
i f ( num2 > num1 ){
var temp = num1 ;
num1 = num2 ;
num2 = temp ;
}
whi le ( t rue ) {
num1 %= num2 ;
i f ( num1 == 0) re turn num2 ;
num2 %= num1 ;
i f ( num2 == 0) re turn num1 ;
}
}
Figure 6: Abstract Syntax Tree [3]
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Bytecode Generator: AST as given as an input to the Bytecode generator. The
Bytecode generator converts AST into bytecode.
For example, if there are two variables that need to be added, the generator will
select that block from the AST and convert it into bytecode.
iload_1
iload_2
iadd 3
istore 3
These are explained as load first and second variable at offset 1 and 2 in the
register. Add those two values and store it at offset 3.
Interpreter: The Interpreter converts the bytecode generated by the Bytecode
generator as input. This bytecode is then converted to machine level code with the
help of JIT which is executed at runtime. For example, the above bytecode is given
as:
MOV EAX 0xFF20
MOV EBX 0xFF24
SUB EAX EBX
MOV ECX EAX
5.2 Steps
Consider a file named as test.js. The contents of the file are:
Listing 5.2: test.js
f unc t i on rh i n oF i l e ( ){
var a = 5 + 5 ;
}
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This Javascript file can be converted to Java bytecode representation using the
following command:
java -cp /Users/awadhwani/Downloads/rhino1_7R4/js.jar
org.mozilla.javascript.tools.jsc.Main rhinoFile.js
This gives a rhinoFile.class file which can be then used to convert to bytecode
by using:
javap -c rhinoFile.class
The output of this command gives the following result:
Figure 7: rhinoFile.js Bytecode
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CHAPTER 6
Detecting Metamorphic JavaScript
The primary purpose is to detect metamorphic malware from a set of given files.
The purpose of metamorphism is to reduce the accuracy of the classifier to detect it
as a malware. If for example a classifier clearly understands the difference between a
malware and benign file, introducing metamorphism will break the model’s accuracy
and thus the model would misclassify malware files as benign. The aim here is to
detect such malware files that are classified as benign, basically we want to detect
false negatives that are introduced because of the morphing engine.
We want to classify the morphed code from the original code to be able to tell
that the given file is still a malware file. Section 6.1 gives information about the
dataset used. Section 6.2 explains the preprocessing required on the source code to
extract features explained in section 6.3. Section 6.4 is used for training on the features
extracted and running machine learning classification to classify morphed and non
morphed source code.
6.1 Dataset
The benign dataset [32] is a set of 150K benign JavaScript files. These files are
collected from GitHub repositories and are filtered and processed by removing all the
duplicate files, removing project forks and keeping the programs that can be parsed.
As part of the malware dataset, we use 40,000 malware samples from a github
repository of JavaScript malware collection [33]. These files are parsed from github
repository and it consists of JavaScript files from standard libraries and frameworks
present on github. We have used entire 40,000 malware samples from the mentioned
repository for malware samples and 40,000 benign samples from the benign dataset.
All files from both the dataset are of the .js format.
For the purpose of having a morphed dataset, we use the morphing engine
26
mentioned in Chapter 4. The malware dataset is morphed using the techniques like
variable renaming, dead code insertion, function reordering, instruction substitution
and instruction substitution and generated newer versions of the files which can reduce
the accuracy of the classification model explained in Chapter 7. Thus, we generate
40,000 morphed samples of malware.
6.2 Preprocessing
The source code cannot be directly compared to the other source code to determine
if the given file is harmful or not. The given input file is a .js format file and has to
be preprocessed to generate features that a machine learning classifier will train on.
Bytecodes are extracted from Rhino Javascript Engine explained in Chapter 5. Figure
7 shows sample bytecode file extracted from Javascript code in Section 5.2. After
extraction of bytecode files, opcode sequences in those files are extracted. According to
the official documentation of JAVA SE [34], a JVM instruction consist of an opcode,
which specifies the operation to be performed. The opcode is followed by zero or
more operands which are values that are to be operated upon. Examples of opcode
are aload_0, iload_3, aload_2, tableswitch. The complete list of opcodes are
specified in the official Oracle docs of JAVA SE [34]. These opcodes are extracted
from the bytecode sequence for every file and placed in a sequence file where every
line represents a file. Figure 8 shows the sequence file snippet.
Every line in the file is a sequence of opcodes present in the bytecode of the
file. Thus, opcode sequence files are generated for benign, malware and morphed
dataset. Post creation of these files, we extract the features explained in section 6.3.
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Figure 8: Example sequence file
6.3 Feature Extraction
With the sequence file as input we need to extract features to be trained into a
machine learning model [35]. Feature extraction is done in two ways.
1. One way is to extract n-grams [36] [26] from the sequence file, in which the
value of N can vary. The process of extracting features from n-grams is explained
in 6.3.1.
2. Second way is to extract HMM A, B and 𝜋 matrix for each file from the sequence
file. This approach is explained in the section 6.5
6.3.1 N-gram Extraction
N-grams are a set of words occurring together in a given window size. We move
one word at each window and take the next set of words. N-grams are used in text
mining and Natural language processing tasks [37]. Since N-grams are based on
sequence of the words, it is the right fit in source code features [38].
Following is an example of N-grams extracted from a sequence file:
For N=5, the N-gram features can be:
28
(sipush, sipush, invokevirtual, getfield, tableswitch) ,
(sipush, invokevirtual, getfield, tableswitch, aload) ,
(invokevirtual, getfield, tableswitch, aload, getfield) ,
....
If we are planning to classify between morphed and non-morphed code. The
process of extracting feature vectors would be as follows:
1. Extract N-grams from both the given sequence files (morphed and non-morphed).
2. Find out the count of all N-grams present in both files.
3. Take highest K occurring N-grams as the ground truth for generating feature
vectors.
4. Create vector with size K for every line in the individual sequence file.
5. Loop for all the lines in the file and mark the index as frequency of the n-gram
on that index is present in highest K n-gram vector, otherwise 0.
6. Consider the final vector array as feature vectors to be given for classification.
For example, we take top 100 N-grams with the value of N=5, frequency wise from the
entire dataset containing morphed and non-morphed files. Each line in the sequence
files is a 100 size vector with value on a index is the frequency of the N-gram in that
line, otherwise 0. Similar work for malware classification is done using n-grams in [39]
So, feature vector may look like:
[12,4,5,33,78,0,1,...........12,3] - Line 1 of morphed file ,
[2,55,25,36,9,0,0,...........0,9] - Line 2 of morphed file
Length of feature vector = 100 These feature vectors are then given to machine
learning models for classification.
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6.3.2 HMM feature extraction
Another approach to extract features is by training the HMM model on an
observation sequence. In this method, we take top 26 occurring opcodes from the
dataset. In our example, when we take top occurring opcodes we get:
[’invokestatic’, ’sipush’, ’putstatic’, ’ldc_w’, ’invokespecial’, ..]
These opcodes are then represented in numbers starting from 0.
So, invokestatic = 0, sipush = 1, putstatic = 2 and so on. Thus, non-
morphed and morphed sequence files are replaced by numeric mappings of the opcodes
given in the map formed. We only take top 26 occurring opcodes, rest every other
opcode is taken as other = 26 Thus, eventually an observation sequence file would
look like:
[1, 5, 18, 3, 3, 0, 11, 7, ....]
This observation sequence is extracted for both types of sequence files and taken
as input for HMM models.
6.4 Training using N-gram
Post feature extraction, we train the machine learning models explained in the
below sections. These models take N-gram generated feature vectors and train on
them. Cross-validation with 80-20 split is applied.
6.4.1 SVM
SVMs is a supervised learning model. SVM algorithm finds a hyperplane in a
N-dimensional space that would separate points of different classes [40]. Data points
can come on either side of the hyperplane and the objective is to maximize the distance
between data points and the hyperplane. Thus, by separating the points we can have
achive classification between the data points. It is well suited for malware detection
as explained in [20].
30
6.4.2 Random Forest
Random forest is a supervised learning algorithm. In Random Forest, we have
many decision trees working in parallel. A decision tree is a machine learning model
in which decisions are taken at attributes and a tree like structure is created which
eventually holds a class. The basic structure of Random Forest is when we merge
many decision trees [40]. The idea behind this is that we can combine decision tree
models to increase the overall accuracy of the model.
6.4.3 K Nearest Neighbors
In k-nearest neighbor, a class of a point in Euclidean space is determined by
calculating distance between every other point [40]. Majority of the top k classes
distance wise are taken for the point in question. In voting process, whatever majority
of the classes are for the k points, that class is assigned to that point. Value of k is
taken to be odd, since there should never be a tie.
6.4.4 Naive Bayes
Naive Bayes works on definition the probability of features in all the classes with
having classes from c_0 through c_k and features from x_0 through x_n. Using this,
it will determine the class of the point in question. For this, we use the Bayes rule
[41].
𝑃 (A|B) = 𝑃 (A)𝑃 (B|A)
𝑃 (B)
(6)
6.5 HMM
As explained in section 6.3.2, we extract observation sequence for morphed as well
as non morphed dataset. Using these observation sequences, multiple experiments are
run on it. We change the value of N with every experiment and observe the results.
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6.5.1 Training
The training phase of HMM is explained as Problem 3 in section 2.3.4. Using the
dataset explained in section 6.1 for both malware non-morphed and malware morphed,
we strip out T = 50,000 opcodes and train the HMM with 1000 iterations. The value
of M is taken as 26 since we have 26 top occurring opcode symbols and N is taken
as [2, 3, 5] for experimentation. A, B and 𝜋 matrix are initialized randomly making
them row stochastic.
The HMM follows the estimate and maximize(EM) algorithm [42]. In the maxi-
mize step the observation vector is aligned with the state in that model and the log
likelihood is maximized. The estimate step estimates the parameters for vectors that
are aligned to the state and the state transition probabilities. There is a maximize
and estimate step for each iteration. This repeats for all iterations mentioned in the
model.
6.5.2 Classification using HMM vectors
As explained in the section 6.4, N-gram vectors are used to train the machine
learning models like SVM, Random Forest, K Nearest Neighbors, Feed forward Neural
Network. Though these provide good accuracy in terms of detection as mentioned in
the 7 section. We could have different set of feature vectors which are explained in
section 6.3.2.
Each HMM run gives a A, B and 𝜋 matrix. These values could be merged together
and used as feature vectors. So for each HMM with N=2, we get a 2 × 2 A matrix
and a 2 × 26 B matrix. If we merge these two together we get a 2 × 28 matrix which
can be then flattened and used as a feature vector. Thus, our feature vector here
would be a 1 × 56 vector for each HMM run. As the HMM is run for both types of
sequence files - morphed and non morphed, we get feature vectors for both the classes.
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For example, consider A matrix as[︂
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
]︂
Consider B matrix as [︂
𝑏11 𝑏12 𝑏13 . . . 𝑏126
𝑏21 𝑏22 𝑏23 . . . 𝑏226
]︂
When we merge these two and flatten we get,
[︀
𝑎11 𝑎12 𝑏11 𝑏12 . . . 𝑏126 𝑎21 𝑎22 𝑏21 𝑏22 . . . 𝑏226
]︀
This matrix is then used as a feature vector for one HMMs that run on 50,000 opcodes
from one type of sequence file. The process is explained in section 6.5. Non morphed
sequence file HMM feature vectors are given a class 0, representing non-morph class
and Morphed sequence file HMM feature vectors are given a class 1, representing
morph class. After this, it is a standard machine learning classification problem. After
we receive these feature vectors, we can use all the classification models explained in
6.4. It is observed that these features give better accuracy as compared to N-gram
features as explained in 7.
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CHAPTER 7
Experiments
This chapter concentrates on the experiments carried out and results of those
experiments covered in 7.2. It also explains the setup used for these experiments in
section 7.1.
The focus of the experiments is two-fold:
1. First part concentrates on reducing the accuracy of a malware detector by
inducing code morphing.
2. The second part concentrates on increasing the accuracy of morph code detector.
7.1 Setup
A virtual machine is used for training malware samples. Oracle VirtualBox is used
for maintaining a virtual machine. Table 2 explains the host machine specifications
and Table 3 explains the guest machine specifications.
Feature extraction for N-grams and HMM feature vectors is done using the guest
machine as we deal with malware files. After we extract the feature vectors, we predict
the results on the host machine. The classification based on machine learning models
and prediction is done on the host machine.
Attribute Specification
Model MacBook Pro (Retina, 15-inch, Mid 2015)
Processor 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7
Memory 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3
System Type 64-bit OS
Operating System macOs Mojave 10.14.3
Table 2: Host Machine Specifications
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Attribute Specification
Software Oracle VirtualBox Version 6.0.4 r128413
Base memory 4096 MB
Processors 4
System Type 64-bit OS
Operating System Linux Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS
Table 3: Guest Machine Specifications
7.2 Results
The first section focuses on reducing the accuracy of existing malware detectors.
The next section focuses on building a morphed code detector using N-gram frequency
and HMM vector as features.
7.2.1 Reducing the accuracy of malware detector
The primary purpose of this section is to explain how code morphing can reduce
the accuracy of an existing malware detector. These techniques are explained in
Chapter 4. The techniques implemented are:
• Inserting No-operation instruction.
• Variable Renaming
• Instruction Reordering
• Function Reordering
The malware detector is trained on malware and benign dataset explained in section
6.1. Various machine learning models are used for the classification.
• K Nearest Neighbours
• Random Forest
• Support Vector Machine
• Naive Bayes
These models with varied parameters are trained with malware and benign dataset.
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Accuracy is taken as a measure of comparison. Classifcation models are judged by
plotting Receiver Operating Characteristics curve [43]. Area under the curve explains
the correctness of classification models.
a) Random Forest
Random Forest achieves the AUC-ROC of 0.93 with 100 trees in the forest.
Figure 9: Random Forest
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b) K Nearest Neighbours
K Nearest Neighbors achieves AUC-ROC of 0.94. This is with value of K = 5
Figure 10: K Nearest Neighbours
c) Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine achieves AUC-ROC of 0.96. Kernel used is linear
Figure 11: Support Vector Machine
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d) Naïve Bayes - AUC-ROC - 0.94
Figure 12: Naïve Bayes
In the results above, SVM with linear kernel gives the best results of malware
detection with accuracy of 95.25%. For SVM, post application of the morphing
techniques, the accuracy of the model is degraded to 73.3%. Table 4 depict the
degraded accuracy’s of various models. These results are obtained with one level of
morphing. K-Nearest Neighbor has the max accuracy drop of 37.3%.
Table 4: Accuracy Drop
Model Accuracy Morphed Accuracy Accuracy Drop
KNN 93.5% 56.2% 37.3%
Random Forest 86.5% 54.55% 31.95%
SVM 95.25% 73.3% 21.95%
Naïve Bayes 85.75% 49% 36.75%
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Figure 13: Accuracy Drop Graph
Figure 13 shows the accuracy drop, the x-axis represents the four classifiers: Random
Forest, Naïve Bayes, K Nearest Neighbors, and Support Vector Machine. The y-axis
shows the accuracy for all the classifiers. The yellow bars show the original accuracy
and the green bars show the morphed accuracy after applying morphing techniques
explained in Section 4. Figure 14 shows the effect of dead code on accuracy. On the
x-axis we have percentage of dead code added in the files, on y-axis we have accuracy.
So, as and when we increase the amount of dead code, the accuracy keeps decreasing.
For 75% of dead code, accuracy drops till 47%.
Thus, classifiers accuracy can be dropped significantly using code morphing. The
next section concentrates on training the model to learn morphing using the same
machine learning models and also using HMM. As explained in the section 2.3.4, HMM
is a statistical model well suited for sequential analysis. Thus, experiments are done
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using HMM and are explained in the next section.
Figure 14: Accuracy Drop - Dead Code
7.2.2 Building a metamorphic detector
Morphing malware have reduced the significance of signature based detection as
it becomes very difficult to know each variant of the morphed code [44]. Thus, it is
very important to experiment on techniques that could detect metamorphic malware.
The experiments in this section involve using machine learning models explained in
chapter 6.
We will first experiment by using feature vectors explained in section 6.3.1. These
features are created from the idea of the existence of top n-grams available in a file.
The idea is that if a malware file consists of a given set of common n-grams, and if
the file in question has a majority of them, we classify that file as malware. Even
after morphing techniques like introducing new code, changing variables would not
change the entire flow of opcodes.
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a) Random Forest using N-grams with N=5
Random Forest achieves the AUC-ROC of 0.97 with 100 trees in the forest.
Figure 15: Random Forest using N-grams
b) K-Nearest Neighbours using N-grams with N=5, K=5
K Nearest Neighbors achieves AUC-ROC of 0.99. This is with value of K = 5
Figure 16: K Nearest Neighbours using N-grams
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c) Support Vector Machine using N-grams with N=5
Support Vector Machine achieves AUC-ROC of 0.98. Kernel used is ’linear’
Figure 17: Support Vector Machine using N-grams
d) Naive Bayes using N-grams with N=5 - AUC-ROC - 0.81
Figure 18: Naive Bayes using N-grams
We experiment with different values of k in KNN. The values of K used are 3,5,7 and
11. In case of Random Forest we use 100 trees. The number of trees are also varied
and 100, 200 and 300 are used for training.
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The second approach is to use HMM to train on morphed sequences. We use
two HMM models in which one we train on a malware opcode sequence from 40,000
files and the other one we train on morphed malware opcode sequences from 40,000
morphed samples. The HMM specifications used are N = [2,3,5], M = 26, iterations
= 1000 and random row stochastic values for A, B and 𝜋 matrix. The HMM is run
on T = 50,000 opcode sequences from the two sequence files. The two HMM models
provide final A, B and 𝜋 matrix for both type of sequence files. Thus, as explained in
section 6.3.2, we merge the A, B and 𝜋 matrix to get a feature vector and we can run
classification on them.
After we receive feature vectors, it becomes a machine learning classification
problem. Thus we can apply standard machine learning techniques to classify on
the basis of the feature vectors. The following experiments are performed with N=2.
Experiments with varied values of N is presented in Appendix A
a) Random Forest using HMM vectors with N=2
Random Forest achieves the AUC-ROC of 0.99 with 100 trees in the forest.
Figure 19: Random Forest using HMM vectors
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b) K Nearest Neighbours using HMM vectors with N=2
K Nearest Neighbors achieves AUC-ROC of 0.86. This is with value of K = 5
Figure 20: K Nearest Neighbours using HMM vectors
c) Support Vector Machine using HMM vectors with N=2
Support Vector Machine achieves AUC-ROC of 0.97. Kernel used is ’linear’
Figure 21: Support Vector Machine using HMM vectors
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d) Naive Bayes using HMM vectors with N=2
Naive Bayes performs the worst with AUC-ROC as 0.88
Figure 22: Naive Bayes using HMM vectors
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, the aim was to detect metamorphic malware. We first introduced
the metamorphic engine to morph the JavaScript based code. The techniques used are
variable renaming, function reordering, instruction reordering, dead code insertion and
instruction substitution. These techniques when used together provide great levels of
code obfuscation. As discussed in the project, major anti-virus software programs use
signature based detection for detecting malwares which would eventually fail because
of code obfuscation. We are using NodeJS esprima and escodegen to convert the
code to and from Abstract Syntax Tree of that code. Abstract Syntax Trees are used
to morph the code by changing the logical structure using the techniques mentioned
above. With this we achieve a 21.95% drop from 95.25% to 73.3% when using SVM as
a malware detector with max accuracy drop of 37.3% while using K-Nearest Neighbor.
The next part of the project is to detect metamorphic code. Since we have the
source code, we cannot directly compare the source files to classify malware files. Thus,
we converted it into meaningful feature vectors. First approach was to use N-gram
feature vectors on bytecode files of those JavaScript source codes. We use Rhino
JavaScript engine to convert JavaScript code to JAVA bytecodes. The bytecode file
is then used to extract opcodes from. The sequence of opcode symbols are important
in the experiment rather than the entire source file. We remove opcodes from all the
files and place it in a sequence file where every line of opcodes represents a file. Thus
for detecting metamorphic malware, we have sequence files for malware as well as
morphed malware. We then take out N-gram frequency features and apply machine
learning models like SVM, Random Forest, Naive Bayes and K Nearest Neighbor.
From this, Support Vector Machine gives the best accuracy of 97% and AUC-ROC of
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0.98.
We also experimented using HMM feature vectors. In the same sequence files for
malware and morphed malware, instead of the opcodes, we represent the opcodes
in numeric format. We calculate the frequency of the opcodes in the sequence files
and keep only top 26 opcode symbols. Using N = [2,3,5], M = 26, T = 50,000 and
iterations = 1000 we train the HMM model and extract A, B and 𝜋 matrix for each
HMM output for 50,000 opcodes. These matrices are merged together and form a
feature vector for classification models. After we get the feature vectors of 1 × 56
dimension. We use it for classification with the same machine learning models used
for N-gram feature vectors. Using HMM feature vectors, SVM performs the best with
96.8% accuracy with KNN being on the second position with 96.38% accuracy.
The main purpose of these approaches is that if a malware file is morphed, it can
act as benign in most of the malware detectors. Thus, to catch such type of malware
we have a metamorphic detector which would determine that there is some morphing
involved in the file and needs to be scrutinized again. Thus, we mark such files as
a potential candidate of being a malware. As part of future work, we can combine
this approach along with dynamic analysis where we run a sandbox to understand
the behavior of the files and detect malware files easily. As we followed a two-fold
process by degrading the accuracy of a detector thereby increasing accuracy for morph
code detection, we could experiment in the field of Malware GAN [45] where there are
two neural networks that compete with each other to improve metamorphic malware
creation. One neural network aims to create newer versions of malware to beat the
other network which tries to differentiate between two classes. It will be an interesting
field of research. We could also try to detect Transcriptase [46] malware.
47
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] M. Stamp, ‘‘A revealing introduction to Hidden Markov Models,’’ Department of
Computer Science San Jose State University, pp. 26--56, 2004.
[2] M. Statistics, ‘‘Trends report| av-test,’’ 2017. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.av-test.org/fileadmin/pdf/security_report/AV-TEST_
Security_Report_2017-2018.pdf
[3] A. Prabhu, ‘‘Working of rhino.’’ [Online]. Available: http://www.quora.com/
JavaScript-programming-language/How-does-a-JavaScript-engine-work
[4] ‘‘Greg zemskov.’’ [Online]. Available: https://www.plesk.com/blog/product-
technology/hidden-website-threats-deal-with-site-malware
[5] Wikipedia contributors, ‘‘Sony bmg copy protection rootkit scandal ---
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,’’ 2019, [Online; accessed 18-April-2019].
[Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sony_BMG_
copy_protection_rootkit_scandal&oldid=881854109
[6] ‘‘Panda security (n.d.). virus, worms, trojans and backdoors: Other harmful
relatives of viruses.’’ [Online]. Available: http://www.pandasecurity.com/
homeusers-cms3/security-info/about-malware/generalconcep
[7] C. Annachhatre, T. H. Austin, and M. Stamp, ‘‘Hidden markov models for
malware classification,’’ Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques,
vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 59--73, 2015.
[8] J. Aycock, Computer Viruses and Malware. Springer US, 2006.
[9] M. Musale, T. H. Austin, and M. Stamp, ‘‘Hunting for metamorphic javascript
malware,’’ Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, vol. 11, no. 2,
pp. 89--102, 2015.
[10] X. Li, P. K. Loh, and F. Tan, ‘‘Mechanisms of polymorphic and metamorphic
viruses,’’ in 2011 European intelligence and security informatics conference.
IEEE, 2011, pp. 149--154.
[11] B. B. Rad, M. Masrom, and S. Ibrahim, ‘‘Camouflage in malware: from encryption
to metamorphism,’’ International Journal of Computer Science and Network
Security, vol. 12, no. 8, pp. 74--83, 2012.
48
[12] A. S. Bist, ‘‘Detection of metamorphic viruses: A survey,’’ in 2014 Interna-
tional Conference on Advances in Computing, Communications and Informatics
(ICACCI). IEEE, 2014, pp. 1559--1565.
[13] I. You and K. Yim, ‘‘Malware obfuscation techniques: A brief survey,’’ in 2010
International conference on broadband, wireless computing, communication and
applications. IEEE, 2010, pp. 297--300.
[14] V. S. Koganti, L. K. Galla, and N. Nuthalapati, ‘‘Internet worms and its de-
tection,’’ in 2016 International Conference on Control, Instrumentation, Com-
munication and Computational Technologies (ICCICCT). IEEE, 2016, pp.
64--73.
[15] Z. Bazrafshan, H. Hashemi, S. M. H. Fard, and A. Hamzeh, ‘‘A survey on
heuristic malware detection techniques,’’ in The 5th Conference on Information
and Knowledge Technology. IEEE, 2013, pp. 113--120.
[16] M. Stamp, Information security: principles and practice. John Wiley & Sons,
2011.
[17] W. Liu, P. Ren, K. Liu, and H.-x. Duan, ‘‘Behavior-based malware analysis
and detection,’’ in 2011 First International Workshop on Complexity and Data
Mining. IEEE, 2011, pp. 39--42.
[18] G. Hăjmăşan, A. Mondoc, and O. Creț, ‘‘Dynamic behavior evaluation for
malware detection,’’ in 2017 5th International Symposium on Digital Forensic
and Security (ISDFS). IEEE, 2017, pp. 1--6.
[19] S. Priyadarshi, ‘‘Metamorphic detection via emulation,’’ 2011.
[20] I. Firdausi, A. Erwin, A. S. Nugroho, et al., ‘‘Analysis of machine learning
techniques used in behavior-based malware detection,’’ in 2010 second interna-
tional conference on advances in computing, control, and telecommunication
technologies. IEEE, 2010, pp. 201--203.
[21] W.-J. Li, K. Wang, S. J. Stolfo, and B. Herzog, ‘‘Fileprints: Identifying file
types by n-gram analysis,’’ in Proceedings from the Sixth Annual IEEE SMC
Information Assurance Workshop. IEEE, 2005, pp. 64--71.
[22] T. H. Austin, E. Filiol, S. Josse, and M. Stamp, ‘‘Exploring hidden markov models
for virus analysis: a semantic approach,’’ in 2013 46th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences. IEEE, 2013, pp. 5039--5048.
[23] A. Krogh, ‘‘An introduction to hidden markov models for biological sequences.’’
49
[24] M. G. Schultz, E. Eskin, F. Zadok, and S. J. Stolfo, ‘‘Data mining methods for
detection of new malicious executables,’’ in Proceedings 2001 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy. S&P 2001. IEEE, 2001, pp. 38--49.
[25] F. Rezaei, M. K. Nezhad, S. Rezaei, and A. Payandeh, ‘‘Detecting encrypted
metamorphic viruses by hidden markov models,’’ in 2014 11th International
Conference on Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discovery (FSKD). IEEE, 2014,
pp. 973--977.
[26] S. M. Sridhara and M. Stamp, ‘‘Metamorphic worm that carries its own morphing
engine,’’ Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, vol. 9, no. 2,
pp. 49--58, 2013.
[27] G. Blanc, D. Miyamoto, M. Akiyama, and Y. Kadobayashi, ‘‘Characterizing
obfuscated javascript using abstract syntax trees: Experimenting with mali-
cious scripts,’’ in 2012 26th International Conference on Advanced Information
Networking and Applications Workshops. IEEE, 2012, pp. 344--351.
[28] Wikipedia contributors, ‘‘Abstract syntax tree --- Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia,’’ 2019, [Online; accessed 18-April-2019]. [Online]. Available: https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Abstract_syntax_tree&oldid=891491683
[29] J. Picado, ‘‘Abstract syntax trees on javascript.’’ [Online]. Available: https://
medium.com/@jotadeveloper/abstract-syntax-trees-on-javascript-534e33361fc7
[30] A. Hidayat, ‘‘Esprima npm.’’ [Online]. Available: https://www.npmjs.com/
package/esprima
[31] Y. Suzuki, ‘‘Escodegen npm.’’ [Online]. Available: https://www.npmjs.com/
package/escodegen
[32] V. Raychev, P. Bielik, M. Vechev, and A. Krause, ‘‘Learning programs from noisy
data,’’ in ACM SIGPLAN Notices, vol. 51, no. 1. ACM, 2016, pp. 761--774.
[33] H. Petrak, ‘‘github repo: javascript-malware-collection.’’ [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/HynekPetrak/javascript-malware-collection
[34] Oracle, ‘‘Jvm instruction set.’’ [Online]. Available: https://docs.oracle.com/
javase/specs/jvms/se7/html/jvms-6.html
[35] S. Ranveer and S. Hiray, ‘‘Comparative analysis of feature extraction methods of
malware detection,’’ International Journal of Computer Applications, vol. 120,
no. 5, 2015.
[36] J. Z. Kolter and M. A. Maloof, ‘‘Learning to detect and classify malicious
executables in the wild,’’ Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 7, no. Dec,
pp. 2721--2744, 2006.
50
[37] I. Santos, Y. K. Penya, J. Devesa, and P. G. Bringas, ‘‘N-grams-based file
signatures for malware detection.’’ ICEIS (2), vol. 9, pp. 317--320, 2009.
[38] S. Jain and Y. K. Meena, ‘‘Byte level n--gram analysis for malware detection,’’ in
International Conference on Information Processing. Springer, 2011, pp. 51--59.
[39] Z. Fuyong and Z. Tiezhu, ‘‘Malware detection and classification based on n-grams
attribute similarity,’’ in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Computational
Science and Engineering (CSE) and IEEE International Conference on Embedded
and Ubiquitous Computing (EUC), vol. 1. IEEE, 2017, pp. 793--796.
[40] A. Singh, N. Thakur, and A. Sharma, ‘‘A review of supervised machine learning
algorithms,’’ in 2016 3rd International Conference on Computing for Sustainable
Global Development (INDIACom). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1310--1315.
[41] H. Zhang and D. Li, ‘‘Naïve bayes text classifier,’’ in 2007 IEEE International
Conference on Granular Computing (GRC 2007). IEEE, 2007, pp. 708--708.
[42] J. M. (https://stats.stackexchange.com/users/44603/jeffm), ‘‘Training a
hidden markov model, multiple training instances,’’ Cross Validated,
uRL:https://stats.stackexchange.com/q/95553 (version: 2014-04-29). [Online].
Available: https://stats.stackexchange.com/q/95553
[43] A. P. Bradley, ‘‘The use of the area under the roc curve in the evaluation of
machine learning algorithms,’’ Pattern recognition, vol. 30, no. 7, pp. 1145--1159,
1997.
[44] S. Choudhary and M. D. Vidyarthi, ‘‘A simple method for detection of meta-
morphic malware using dynamic analysis and text mining,’’ Procedia Computer
Science, vol. 54, pp. 265--270, 2015.
[45] W. Hu and Y. Tan, ‘‘Generating adversarial malware examples for black-box
attacks based on gan,’’ arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.05983, 2017.
[46] F. Di Troia, C. A. Visaggio, T. H. Austin, and M. Stamp, ‘‘Advanced transcriptase
for javascript malware,’’ in 2016 11th International Conference on Malicious and
Unwanted Software (MALWARE). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1--8.
51
APPENDIX
Appendix A
A.1 HMM for detecting metamorphic malware with N=3, M=26,
T=50,000
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.23: HMM with N=3, M=26, T=50,000 (a) Naïve Bayes; (b) K-Nearest
Neighbor; (c) Support Vector Machine; (d) Random Forest
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A.2 HMM for detecting metamorphic malware with N=5, M=26,
T=50,000
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.24: HMM with N=5, M=26, T=50,000 (a) Naïve Bayes; (b) K-Nearest
Neighbor; (c) Support Vector Machine; (d) Random Forest
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A.3 K-Nearest Neighbors for metamorphic malware detection using N-
gram features with K=[3,7,11]
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure A.25: N-grams with K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) as classifier (a) KNN with
N=3; (b) KNN with N=7; (c) KNN with N=11;
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A.4 Random Forest for metamorphic malware detection using N-gram
features with Trees=[200,300]
(a) (b)
Figure A.26: N-grams with Random Forest as classifier (a) Random Forest with
Trees=200; (b) Random Forest with Trees=300;
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